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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN RICHARDS,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
CaseNo.20010987-CA

v.
STATE OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants - Appellee.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, DIVISION OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 2001). On January 22,2002,
the matter was transferred to this Court by the supreme court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)Q (Supp. 2001). R. 112.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Plaintiffs alleged injuries arose out of, are connected with, or resulted from his
incarceration in the state prison. For this reason, the trial court was correct to dismiss the
plaintiffs negligence claims because the State of Utah, Department of Corrections,
Division of Correctional Industries (State) was entitled to immunity under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (Supp. 2001).

This issue was raised by the State in its motion to dismiss (R. 34-35, 40-41, 74-79)
and the trial court granted this motion, in part, based upon this issue R. 90, 92-93.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the State's
motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court should give
the trial courts1 ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard. Zionfs
First National Bank v. Fox & Co.. 942 P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997).
2. The plaintiffs attempted cause of action directly under the federal constitution
was properly dismissed because the State of Utah is immune and no such cause of action
against a sovereign state exists.
This issue was raised by the State in its motion to dismiss (R. 34-35,41-43, 80-81)
and the trial court granted this motion, in part, based upon this issue. R. 90, 92-93.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the State's
motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court should give
the trial courts' ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard. Zion's
First National Bank, 942 P.2d at 326.
3. The trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs state
constitutional claim because of the plaintiffs failure to raise such claim in his notice of
claim.
This issue was not raised in the trial court, but is raised for the first time on appeal.

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW: A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time by either party or by the court. Weiser v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 932
P.2d 596, 597 (Utah 1997). While this issue was not raised in the trial court, this Court
can affirm the decision of the trial court on this related, alternative, ground. Buehner
Block Company v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988); State v. South,
924 P.2d 354, 355 n.3 (Utah 1996).
4. The plaintiff failed to allege a cause of action under the Utah Constitution for
unnecessary rigor where the facts alleged in the complaint state only a claim for
negligence.
This issue was raised by the State in its motion to dismiss (R. 34-35,43-48, 81-84)
and the trial court granted this motion, in part, based upon this issue. R. 90, 92-93.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the State's
motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court should give
the trial courts' ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard. Zion's
First National Bank, 942 P.2d at 326.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & STATUTES
U.S. Const, amend. VIII [Bail - Punishment]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.
Utah Const, art. I, § 9 [Excessive bail and fines - Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall
not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
3

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) Definitions. (Supp. 2001)
(4)(a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation,
function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act,
failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to
government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a
government or governmental function, or could be performed by private
enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department,
agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) Immunity of governmental entities from
suit. (1997)
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home,
or other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program
conducted in either public or private facilities.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 Waiver of immunity for injury caused by
negligent act or omission of employee - Exceptions. (Supp. 2001)
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out
of, in connection with, or results from:
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail,
or other place of legal confinement;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
John Richards brought this action against the State and Waste Management of
Utah, Inc. R. 1-10. Richards alleged that he had been seriously injured as the result of an
accident that occurred while he was involved in vocational training as an inmate of the
Utah State Prison. R. 3,ffif7-11. He sought recovery against the State for the alleged

4

negligence of its employees and for the alleged infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
upon an inmate. R. 4-5,ffif14-20; 7-9,ffl[ 30-42.
Richard's notice of claim stated only claims for negligence and violation of federal
law. R. 14-15. The notice of claim did not state any intent to bring an action under Utah
Const, art. I, § 9.
The State filed a motion to dismiss this action on August 6, 2001. R. 34-50. This
motion was granted by the trial court. R. 90-94. In its order of November 6, 2001, the
trial court, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), expressly determined that there was no just
reason to delay and certified the dismissal of the State as a final judgment. R. 92-93. The
plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on December 5,2001. R. 95-96.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
11

At all times material hereto, John Richards was an inmate" in the custody of the

State. R. 1, ^f 1. He "was an inmate at the Utah State Prison under the custody, care, and
subject to the supervision of the Utah State Department of Corrections." R. 3, ^ 7. At the
time of his alleged accident, Richards was "engaged in a training program administered"
by the State. R. 3, ^ 8. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that a forklift, operated by a
fellow inmate, overturned onto the plaintiff causing his injuries. R. 3,1ffi 10-12.
Plaintiffs negligence claim against the State is based on allegations that the State
failed to properly train and supervise the inmates during their participation in the training
program and failed to warn the plaintiff of these dangerous conditions. R. 4,1fl[ 15-19.

5

The plaintiffs constitutional claims are based upon this same allegation of a failure to
properly supervise inmates in the use of a forklift that they were not properly trained to
operate. R. 8,ffi[34-36.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The plaintiff alleged that he was injured when a forklift overturned in a prison
training program because the inmates were inadequately supervised and trained.
Plaintiffs negligence claim was properly dismissed because immunity has been retained
for injuries arising out of, connected with or resulting from the incarceration of any
person in any state prison. It is undisputed that the plaintiff, and the operator of the
forklift, were inmates of the Utah State Prison participating in a prison program. This
meets the statutory definition of "governmental function" and such immunity is not
unconstitutional.
Plaintiff, admitting that his federal constitutional claim cannot be brought under
section 1983, instead asks this Court to create a Bivens type federal action against the
State of Utah. Bivens actions can only be brought against federal employees. Neither the
government nor private corporations and citizens can be made defendants in such actions.
Further, the State of Utah would be entitled to absolute sovereign immunity.
The plaintiffs notice of claim failed to identify any intention to bring a state
constitutional claim. Thus the court has no jurisdiction to consider such a claim where
the plaintiff has failed to strictly comply with the notice of claim requirement.

6

Finally, the plaintiffs claims of failure to adequately train and supervise inmates
involved in a prison training program do not arise to the level of a violation of either
Utah's cruel and unusual punishment or its unnecessary rigor provisions. The plaintiff,
both in the trial court and on appeal, failed to present any clearly established law that
would show that such negligence would violate either of these provisions.
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES AROSE OUT OF, IN
CONNECTION WITH OR RESULTED FROM HIS
INCARCERATION AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON
The plaintiffs first cause of action against the State sounds in tort. R. 4-5. The
State of Utah's immunity has not been waived for intentional torts. Atiya v. Salt Lake
County, 852 P.2d 1007, 1011 (Utah App. 1993). The only possible waiver of immunity
that might be applicable to the plaintiffs tort claim would be that found in Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 2001) for the negligence of government employees.
The Utah Supreme Court has applied a three-step approach to determining whether
or not immunity is applicable to a specific case. Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist.. 849
P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993). The first step is to determine whether the activity
performed by the entity is a governmental function. The second step requires a
determination of whether there is an applicable waiver of immunity. If such a waiver
exists, the third step is to determine whether immunity has been retained by an applicable
exception to the waiver of immunity.

7

A. The Complained of Actions were a Governmental Function
The Governmental Immunity Act expressly defines all actions by governmental
entities as being governmental functions.
(4)(a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation,
function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act,
failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to
government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a
government or governmental function, or could be performed by private
enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department,
agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (Supp. 2001). This definition is very inclusive. The
operation of a training program for incarcerated individuals comes within the statutory
definition of "governmental function" and the first step is thereby satisfied.
Instead of even mentioning the statutory definition of what is a governmental
function, the plaintiff relies upon an outdated and overturned judicial interpretation of
what that phrase means. In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230, 1236
(Utah 1980), relied upon by the plaintiff, the court established the "core governmental
function" test. This test was adopted as a matter of statutory interpretation of the phrase
"governmental function" in the immunity act. But, as noted in Ledfors, the 1987 statutory
definition of a "governmental function" was enacted with the intent of rejecting the
Standiford test.
In 1987, the legislature broadened the definition of "governmental function"
in section 63-30-2(4) to include all governmental operations that under our
8

prior case law construing the pre-1987 statutory language, conceivably
could have been characterized as ineligible for immunity. Comparing the
language in our pre-1987 case law with the language of the 1987
amendment leaves no doubt that our pre-1987 cases were the target of this
amendment.
Ledfors, 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993). In Ledfors, the court applied the statutory
definition of "governmental function" in lieu of the rejected pre-1987 case law definition
found in Standiford. Therefore the plaintiffs reliance on the Standiford test is misplaced.
Nor is there any constitutional infirmity in applying this statutory definition to the
State of Utah and its Department of Corrections. Under the courts' interpretation of the
open courts clause (Utah Const, art. I, § 11), the first question is whether the challenged
statute has abrogated a remedy that existed at the time the statute was enacted. Day v.
State of Utah, 980 P.2d 1171, 1184 (Utah 1999).
It is undisputed that at no time did a common law cause of action exist to sue the
State of Utah. Tiede v. State of Utah, 915 P.2d 500, 503-4 (Utah 1996) (immunity of the
State of Utah and its Department of Corrections does not violate state constitution).
Sovereign immunity was a settled feature of the common law. From the time the
common law was adopted by Utah until the present day, Utah's common law has
recognized the ongoing viability of sovereign immunity. The State had absolute
immunity at common law and could not be sued without its consent. All action
undertaken by the State of Utah was considered to be a governmental function. See
Tiede: Campbell v. Pack. 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d 464,465 (1964) (school district, as

9

an agent of the State, partakes of the state's absolute sovereign immunity); Bingham v.
Bd.ofEduc. 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432,435 (1950) (all acts of a school board, as an
agent of the State, are governmental functions and it is unlike a municipal corporation
that has a dual character and can exercise either governmental or proprietary functions);
State v. Dist. Court. Fourth Jud. Dist. 78 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1937) (state immune from
both damage and injunctive claims at common law); Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road
Comm'n. 70 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1937); Decorso v. Thomas, 50 P.2d 951, 952 (Utah
1935); Wilkinson v. State. 134 P. 626, 630 (Utah 1913).
For these reasons, the trial court was correct when it held that the State's conduct
challenged by the plaintiff in his first cause of action was a governmental function for
which immunity has been retained.
B. The Challenged Actions Arose out of, in Connection with, and Resulted From the
Plaintiffs Incarceration in the State Prison
The plaintiff claims that the waiver of immunity found in Utah Code Ann. § 6330-10 (2001) is applicable. This statute waives immunity for injuries proximately caused
by the negligence of government employees, unless the injury "arises out of, in
connection with, or results from" one of a list of exceptions to this waiver. One such
exception in subsection 10 is for injuries arising out of, connected with, or resulting from
"the incarceration of any person in any state prison." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10)
(Supp. 2001).

10

Utah's courts have repeatedly held that the statutory retention of immunity applies
regardless of the particular type of negligence that the plaintiff may claim, or how the
plaintiff may style his claims. The important question is not the type of negligence
alleged, but rather whether the injuries arose out, are connected with or result from the
incarceration of any person in the state prison. In Ledfors. the court explained:
Again, our prior cases have looked to whether the injury asserted "arose out
of1 conduct or a situation specifically described in one of the subparts of
63-30-10; if it did, then immunity is preserved. We have rejected claims
that have reflected attempts to evade these statutory categories by
recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury
In sum, the Ledforses ignore the fact that the structure of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, especially section 63-30-10, focuses on the
conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of
liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged. Because
Richie's injuries arose out of a battery, we cannot ignore the plain meaning
and fair import of section 63-30-10 of the Act.
Id. at 1166-67 (citing Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 316,445 P.2d 367, 368
(1968)). See also Maddocks v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 740 P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1987)
(rejecting argument that assault and battery exception did not apply to claim that two
police officers negligently failed to intervene to prevent beating of plaintiff by another
officer).
The Utah Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Malcolm v. State. 878
P.2d 1144, 1146-47 (Utah 1994); S.H. v. State. 865 P.2d 1363,1364-65 (Utah 1993);
Petersen v. Bd. of Educ. 855 P.2d 241,242-43 (Utah 1993); and Higgins v. Salt Lake
County. 855 P.2d 231,240-41 (Utah 1993). In each of these decisions, the court
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reiterated that the question of whether the retention of immunities under section 10 is
applicable is determined not by considering the type of negligence alleged, but rather
looking to whether or not the complained-of injuries arose out of one of the listed
situations or conducts found in section 10.
Finally, in Taylor v. Qgden School District, 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996), the court
expressly defined what was meant by the statutory phrase "arose out of."
Taylor maintains that the assault exception should not apply because
Zacharyfs injuries have a greater link to the dangerous window in the
restroom than to Trenton's assault. However, "arises out of1 within the
assault exception ,ffis a phrase of much broader significance than "caused
by.1"" Under the phrase's ordinary meaning, the assault need not be the sole
cause of the injury to except the governmental entity from liability for the
injury. The language demands '"only that there be some causal relationship
between the injury and the risk"1 provided for.
Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163 (citations omitted).
Most recently, the Utah Supreme Court held that injuries received from an
avalanche caused by the naturally occurring snow pack on federal land "arose out of1 a
"natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands" (Utah Code Ann. § 63-3010(11) (Supp. 2001)).
Further, Blackner's injuries arose out of the snow pack and the first
avalanche. Under the statute, the "arise out of1 language requires only that
there be some causal nexus between the risk and the resulting injury. In
other words, but for the snow pack and the first avalanche, Blackner would
not have suffered injury. Here, were it not for the first avalanche, Payne
would not have stopped Blackner and others from proceeding up the
canyon. In addition, if the snow pack had not been situated on public land
above Route 210, it would not have resulted in either avalanche, which
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caused Payne to stop traffic from moving up the canyon and directly
occasioned Blackness injuries.
Blackner v. State of Utah, 2002 UT 44, ^[15 (citations omitted) (a copy is attached hereto
as Addendum A).
It cannot be disputed that but for the plaintiffs incarceration in the Utah State
Prison, he would not have been participating in a training program under the supervision
of the Division of Correctional Industries. There is more than simply some causal nexus
between the plaintiffs incarceration, the incarceration of the inmate who is alleged to
have injured the plaintiff through his negligent operation of a forklift, and the complained
of injuries.
Even if this were not so, the statute gives three alternative relationships between
the injury and the retention of immunity for the incarceration of any person in the Utah
State Prison of which "arises out o f is only one, "connection with" and "results from"
being the others. "Connection" is defined as "3. anything that connects; connecting part;
link; bond." Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 432
(1996). "Result" is defined as "1. to spring, arise, or proceed as a consequence of actions,
circumstances, premises, etc.; be the outcome." Webster at 1642.
An injury suffered during a prison-sponsored training program was clearly
"connected with" the incarceration of a person in the state prison. The cause and effect
connection between the plaintiffs injuries and his incarceration (and that of the inmate
who was driving the forklift) cannot be disputed. This relationship is more than sufficient
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to demonstrate a connecting link or bond between the incarceration of a person in any
state prison and the plaintiffs injuries.
Further, the plaintiffs injuries clearly "resulted from" the incarceration of a person
in a state prison. Plaintiffs complaint expressly alleges that his injuries were caused by
the failure of the State to train and supervise inmates involved in a prison training
program. The claimed injuries were the consequence, the outcome, of the incarceration
of a person in a state prison.
Interpreting broadly these two phrases, as this Court in Taylor, explained "arises
out o f must be interpreted, makes it clear that the trial court correctly determined that the
State's governmental immunity had been retained and the plaintiffs first cause of action
was correctly dismissed.
Nor is the fact that the plaintiff was injured outside the confines of the Utah State
Prison significant. In Kirk v. State. 784 P.2d 1255, 1256-57 (Utah App. 1989), this Court
explained that the retention of immunity applied when an incarcerated person was under
the control of the state.
Either Gardner had "totally escaped the control of the prison and was thus
acting on his own so the prison was not responsible for him" or "he was still
under the control of the prison authorities ... in which latter instance the
prison is immune from suit under the statute."
Id. at 1257. The plaintiff expressly claims that he was injured because the State failed to
adequately supervise and train the plaintiff and his fellow inmates. There is no claim that
the plaintiff or his fellow inmates had totally escaped the control of the State. The trial
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court correctly determined that immunity had been retained relative to the plaintiffs first
cause of action and that decision should be affirmed on appeal.
II. THE STATE OF UTAH AND ITS AGENCIES
CANNOT BE SUED DIRECTLY UNDER THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION FOR DAMAGES
In his third cause of action (R. 7-9), the plaintiff seeks to state a claim against the
State of Utah and its Department of Corrections for alleged violations of both his federal
and state constitutional rights. In the trial court, the State sought dismissal of the federal
claim on the grounds that no such cause of action existed. R. 41-43, 80-81. As to the
state constitutional claim, the State argued that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim
because he had only factually alleged a claim for simple negligence. R. 43-48, 81-84.
Unfortunately, the plaintiff conflates these two very distinct questions in his brief.
Appellants Brief at 20-26. Whether a direct cause of action against the State of Utah
exists under the federal constitution is unrelated to the question of whether the plaintiff
has stated a cause of action against the State of Utah under a self-executing provision of
Utah's Constitution.
Claims that a federal right has been violated by someone acting under color of
state law must be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But the State of Utah and its agencies
cannot be sued under this statute.1 In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police. 491

1

Under the proper circumstances, state employees may be sued under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, but this the plaintiff has not sought to do. Instead, he has sought to sue the State of
Utah and its agencies directly.
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U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the Supreme Court expressly held that "neither a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are 'persons1 under § 1983." Utah's Supreme Court,
following Will has also concluded that § 1983 claims cannot be brought against state
agencies because they are not "persons" under the statute. Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of
Educ. 858 P.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Utah 1993).
In an effort to circumvent these decisions, the plaintiff asks this Court to create a
new cause of action. He asks this Court to create a direct cause of action under the
federal constitution against a sovereign state. Appellant's Brief at 24. The plaintiff urges
this Court to "do what the Supreme Court did in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388 (1971V' Id What plaintiff fails to
understand is that Bivens-type actions cannot be brought against the government, only
against federal employees.
"A Bivens claim is a cause of action brought directly under the United States
Constitution against a federal official acting in his or her individual capacity for
violations of constitutionally protected rights" Buford v. Runvon. 160F.3d 1199, 1203
n.6 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko. 534 U.S.61,
122 S. Ct. 515, 521 (2001) ("The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers
from committing constitutional violations.")
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Mever. 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (FDIC), the
court was asked to create a Bivens-type action against the government. In determining
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whether such a cause of action should be created, the court determined that it must
examine two issues. "The first inquiry is whether there has been a waiver of sovereign
immunity. If there has been such a waiver, as in this case, the second inquiry comes into
play - that is, whether the source of substantive law upon which the claimant relies
provides an avenue for relief." Id at 484.
A. The Sovereign Immunity of the State of Utah Has Not Been Waived
As a matter of federal law, the State of Utah is entitled to absolute sovereign
immunity. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over suits by private parties against a state. Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida. 517 U.S. 44 (1995); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n. 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Indiana. 323 U.S.
459 (1945); Watson v. Univ. of Utah Medical Ctr.. 75 F.3d 569 (10th Cir. 1996). This
Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief
sought. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy. Inc.. 506 U.S. 139
(1993); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon. 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch.
and Hosp. v. Halderman. 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing
Home Ass'n. 450 U.S. 147 (1981); Alabama v. Push. 438 U.S. 781 (1978); and Missouri
v. Fiske. 290 U.S. 18 (1933). States are immune from suits from Native American tribes
and foreign states as well. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak. 501 U.S. 775 (1991);
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
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Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans we haive understood the
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the
States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the
judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty; and that a
State will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has
consented to suit, either expressly or in the "plan of the convention."
Blatchford.501U.S.at779.
Because the State of Utah's sovereign immunity, no federal claim can be brought
against the state unless its immunity has been waived. Sovereign immunity can be
waived by Congress in certain circumstances, and by the states themselves.
Congress can waive the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity "by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Dellmuth v. Muth. 491 U.S.
223, 227-28 (1989). But the only time that Congress can waive Eleventh Amendment
immunity is when it is acting pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Green v. Mansour.
474 U.S. 64 (1985). The only congressional power that has been held, to date, to validly
authorize Congress to waive the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity is Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). If Congress does not have the authority to
waive the immunity of the states in federal court, it is without the power to waive their
immunity in state courts as well. Alden v. Maine. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Of most
importance to the present action is the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a
waiver of the immunity of the states. Quern v. Jordan. 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979).
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Because Congress has not waived the immunity of Utah for a direct claim under the
federal constitution, no such cause of action can exist unless Utah has waived its own
immunity.
While the states can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity, such waivers will
not be inferred easily. The United States Supreme Court has said: "we will find waiver
only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications
from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.'" Florida
Dep^t of Health. 450 U.S. at 150 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)).
A state does not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting a statute
authorizing suits against the state in its own courts. IdL Utah, far from waiving its
sovereign immunity, has expressly stated in the Governmental Immunity Act that its
immunity is retained for injuries arising out of, connected with or resulting from a
violation of civil rights. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (Supp. 2001).
Because the State of Utah would be entitled to sovereign immunity, no Bivens
cause of action can be brought against it and the trial court correctly dismissed the
plaintiffs third cause of action in so far as it sought to state such a federal claim.
B, Bivens-Type Actions Can Only Be Brought Against Federal Officers
Even if the State of Utah was not immune from suit under federal law, the United
States Supreme Court has expressly rejected attempts to extend Bivens-type claims to
government or others who are not federal employees. In FDIC, the United States
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Supreme Court expressly held that a federal agency could not be a defendant in a Bivens
action, even though the agency's sovereign immunity had been waived.
Myer's real complaint is that Pattullo, like many Bivens defendants,
invoked the protection of qualified immunity. But Bivens clearly
contemplated that official immunity would be raised. More importantly,
Meyer's proposed "solution" - essentially the circumvention of qualified
immunity - would mean the evisceration of the Bivens remedy, rather than
its extension. It must be remembered that the purpose of Bivens is to deter
the officer. If we were to imply a damages action directly against federal
agencies, thereby permitting claimants to bypass qualified immunity, there
would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions against
individual officers. Under Meyer's regime, the deterrent effects of the
Bivens remedy would be lost.
Finally, a damages remedy against federal agencies would be
inappropriate even if such a remedy were consistent with Bivens. Here,
unlike in Bivens, there are "special factors counselling hesitation" in the
creation of a damages remedy. If we were to recogni2:e a direct action for
damages against federal agencies, we would be creating a potentially
enormous financial burden for the Federal Government.... We leave it to
Congress to weigh the implications of such a significant expansion of
Government liability.
FDIC 114 S. Ct. at 1005-6 (citations omitted).
These same two considerations weigh against the creation of a Bivens action
against the State of Utah. First, the plaintiff could have brought a civil rights action under
section 1983 against individual employees of the State of Utah. While these defendants
would have been permitted to raise various immunities as defenses to such a claim,
permitting the plaintiff to circumvent these defenses by suing the State of Utah directly is
incompatible with the purposes behind such defenses.
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Second, Congress has not seen fit to waive the immunity of the State of Utah and
create such a direct cause of action. Instead, Congress has made the affirmative decision
to instead provide only a cause of action against state employees under section 1983. Nor
has the Legislature of the State of Utah seen fit to waive the state's immunity.
In Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko. 534 U.S. 61,122 S. Ct. 515 (2001), the
court again held that only federal employees can be sued in a Bivens action. Malesko
rejected an attempt to bring a Bivens action against a private corporation that contracted
with the federal government to provide a community correctional facility. The court
reiterated that the purpose behind Bivens was to deter constitutional wrongdoing by
individual federal officers. "For if a corporate defendant is available for suit, claimants
will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual directly responsible for the
alleged injury." Malesko, 122 S. Ct. at 521.
Just as the United States Supreme Court has held that it would be inappropriate to
create a Bivens cause of action against the government or private individuals, the trial
court was correct to dismiss the plaintiffs efforts to bring a Bivens action against the
State.
For this reason the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs third claim, so far as it is
based on a purported federal cause of action similar to Bivens, should be affirmed.
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III. THE PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM
CONCERNING HIS STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CAUSE OF
ACTION DEPRIVED THE COURTS OF JURISDICTION OVER
THIS CLAIM
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the procedure for suing the State
of Utah, its agencies, and its employees. Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court
have held that the filing of the notices of claim required by the Act is a jurisdictional
precondition to filing any suit against the state or its employees. Lamarr v. Utah State
Dep'tofTransp.. 828 P.2d 535, 540-42 (Utah App. 1992); Rushton v. Salt Lake
CountyJ 999 UT 36, |18, 977 P.2d 1201; Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 249-50
(Utah 1988). Full (strict) compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. Lamarr, 828 P.2d at
540-42; Rushton, 1999 UT 36, If 19; Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d
480,482 (Utah 1975).
At the relevant time, the Governmental Immunity Act required that:
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim
is filed with the attorney general within one year after the claim arises . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 2001) (in part). The Utah Supreme Court has held
that the requirement of filing a notice of claim is very broad and applies comprehensively
to many types of actions.
The Immunity Act defines injury as "death, injury to a person, damage to or
loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person,
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or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his
agent." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5). The language "any other injury that
a person may suffer," in addition to the generalized enumerated categories
listed in the definition indicates an intent to draw a broad net over the
multitudinous harms that plaintiffs might allege against government
officials.
Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT 49,1fl9, 26 P.3d 217 (court without jurisdiction to consider
statutory forfeiture claim due to plaintiffs failure to file a notice of claim).
While the plaintiff filed a notice of claim before commencing this action, it only
gave notice that he would bring a negligence action against the State (R. 14-15) and a
claim "for a violation of John Richards [sic] constitutional rights guaranteed under the
Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42
USCS § 1983 against cruel and unusual punishment." R. 14. No mention of a cause of
action under Utah Const, art. I, § 9 is made in the notice of claim.
The courts are without jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs state constitutional claim
because it is beyond the scope of the notice of claim that was filed. The notice did not
articulate any intent to bring a state constitutional claim, only a federal civil rights claim
and a claim for negligence. The state constitutional claim is beyond the scope of the
notice of claim that was filed and it failed to give the courts jurisdiction to consider the
plaintiffs third cause of action in so far as it is based on a state constitutional claim.
Stralevv.Hallidav. 2000 UT App 38, UU12-17 ,997 P.2d 338 (failure of timely filed
notice of claim to include claim that individual acted with fraud or malice was a
jurisdictional defect for which the suit was properly dismissed: "A proper notice of claim
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must be filed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction.11); Yearslev v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127,
1129 (Utah 1990) (action is barred on any claim not within the scope of the notice of
claim filed); White v. Heber City, 82 Utah 547,26 P.2d 333, 335 (1933) (causes of action
for damages not raised in first, timely, notice of claim were not properly before the court);
Sweet v. Salt Lake City. 43 Utah 306,134 P. 1167,1172 (1913) ("What we do hold,
however, is that where the claimant seeks to recover for a different item or element of
damages, as in this case, he cannot do so for the reason that such item or element is not
described or referred to in the original claim presented to the city council").2
A claim for violation of a state constitutional right is a common law cause of
action the same as a tort claim.
We begin by identifying the source of our authority to award
damages for constitutional violations. Except for the Takings Clause, the
Utah Constitution does not expressly provide damage remedies for
constitutional violations. Thus, aside from the Takings Clause, there is no
textual constitutional right to damages for one who suffers a constitutional
tort
In the absence of applicable constitutional or statutory authority,
Utah courts employ the common l a w . . . . Hence, a Utah court's ability to
award damages for violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
rests on the common law.
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Box Elder Sch. Dist. 2000 UT 87,1J20,16 P.3d 533.

2

While White and Sweet were decided under prior statutes, the Utah Supreme
Court has expressly stated that the statutes in question are "substantively similar to the
provision now in effect" and that "these cases demonstrate that both before and since
enactment of the Government Immunity Act, plaintiffs may sue the state and its
subdivisions only by complying exactly with the statutory requirements provided to do
so." Hallv.Dep'tofCorrs.. 2001 UT 34, ^|24 n.6, 24 P.3d 419.
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Any cruel and unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor cause of action that the
plaintiff may have for damages is founded on the common law, and not directly upon the
state constitution as is an action under the Takings Clause. As such, the notice of claim
provision of the Immunity Act applies.
In regards to such claims, the legislature has the right to implement "any rule or
regulation in regard to the remedy which does not, under pretense of modifying or
regulating it, take away or impair the right itself." Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 736
(Utah 1996) abrogated in part on other grounds by Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Box
Elder Sch. Dist. 2000 UT 87, 1J20 n.5, 16 P.3d 533. Requiring that a constitutional
common law action meet the procedural requirements of the Immunity Act is such an
appropriate rule or regulation.
Regardless of whether the State of Utah may or may not be entitled to sovereign
immunity from a suit brought under the state constitution, the plaintiff was still required
to provide notice of his intent to bring such a suit. In Hall v. Utah State Department of
Corrections, 2001 UT 34, 24 P.3d 419, the court expressly held that the substantive
immunity of the state did not protect it from lawsuits under the Whistleblower Act. Id. at
^[18. But even though substantive immunity did not apply, the court upheld the dismissal
of the action on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the procedural
requirement that he file a notice of claim before filing his action. Id, at 1(21-27. In
reaching this decision, the court stressed the very real and important purposes that the
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notice of claim requirement fulfilled. Id. at TJ22-23 (prevent payment of spurious claims,
permit government ample opportunity to examine into both the cause and extent of the
injury).
This Court reached the same conclusion in rejecting a plaintiffs argument that he
was not required to file a notice of claim because there was no substantive sovereign
immunity applicable to his cause of action,
However, Nielson confuses the scope of the notice requirement with the
extent of substantive sovereign immunity protection. Complying with the
notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is a jurisdictional
requirement and a precondition to suit, and is in no way co-extensive with
the substantive provisions contained within the Governmental Immunity
Act which insulate the sovereign and its operatives from liability.
Nielson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130, 135 (Utah App. 1995) (emphasis in original).
The Governmental Immunity Act is applicable to the plaintiffs state common law
constitutional claim. To hold otherwise would be to create a unique exception from the
legislatively created system for handling all claims against Utah and its political
subdivisions and would cause confusion as to which claims for money or damages came
under the Immunity Act and which did not. Utah's legislature has not made such an
exception in this case and the plaintiff is consequently required to comply with the
Governmental Immunity Act.
Because the plaintiff failed to provide a notice of claim to the State concerning any
claim of violation of his rights under Utah Const, art. I, § 9, the courts are without
jurisdiction to consider this claim and the same was properly dismissed.
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IV. NEGLIGENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CLAIM
UNDER ARTICLE I, § 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
While alleging that his injuries resulted from the negligence and carelessness of
unnamed state employees (R. 4-5), the plaintiff also seeks to state a cause of action for
violation of the unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution. "Excessive bail shall
not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with
unnecessary rigor." Utah Const, art. I, § 9. But in doing so, plaintiff makes only the
factual claim that the State failed to adequately train and supervise inmates using a
forklift. R. 8. Factual allegations of simple negligence are not enough to state a claim
that the plaintiff was treated with unnecessary rigor.
A. Plaintiff Has Failed to Meet the Flagrant Violation Test of Spackman
In Spackman v. Board of Education of the Box Elder County School District, 2000
UT 87,16 P.3d 533, the court held that common law damage actions to enforce selfexecuting state constitutional rights exist only in appropriate circumstances. The first of
three limitations placed on such claims was that the violation must be flagrant.
First, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a "flagrant"
violation of his or her constitutional rights. In essence, this means that a
defendant must have violated "clearly established" constitutional rights "of
which a reasonable person would have known." To be considered clearly
established, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right." The requirements that the unconstitutional conduct be "flagrant"
ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary "human
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frailties of forgetfulness, distractibility, or misjudgment without rendering
[him or her]self liable for a constitutional violation."
IcLatU23.
The only allegations of fact made by the plaintiff in his complaint are that the State
failed to adequately train and supervise inmates working with a forklift in a training
program. Plaintiff has completely failed to allege any facts indicating that a reasonable
person would have understood such allegations of negligent conduct would constitute a
"clearly established" violation of the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment and not to be treated with unnecessary rigor.
The "flagrant" violation test used by the Utah Supreme Court is nothing more nor
less than the common law qualified immunity test used under federal law in section 1983
and Bivens actions. Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For this reason, the
State submits that federal and state decisions concerning qualified immunity are pertinent
to whether or not the plaintiff has stated a "flagrant" violation in the present action. In
Hilliard v. City and County of Denver. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1991) the court
explained, under qualified immunity law, what is meant by the requirement that the
plaintiff demonstrate that the alleged violation was clearly established.
It is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court that the law was clearly
established. In doing so, the plaintiff cannot simply identify a clearly
established right in the abstract and allege that the defendant has violated it.
Instead, the plaintiff "must demonstrate a substantial correspondence
between the conduct in question and prior law allegedly establishing that
the defendant's actions were clearly prohibited." While the plaintiff need
not show that the specific action at issue has previously been held unlawful,
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the alleged unlawfulness must be "apparent" in light of preexisting law.
The "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." If the
plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that the law allegedly violated was clearly
established, the plaintiff is not allowed to proceed with the suit.
930 F.2d at 1518 (citations omitted).
The "preexisting law" which must show the unlawfulness of the alleged
misconduct must be case law. To be clearly established, the case law must be such that a
reasonable person would be able to recognize that his or her conduct had been declared
unconstitutional by prior court decisions. "For the law to be 'clearly established,1 there
'must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts must be as plaintiff maintains.1" Holland v.
Harrington. 268 F.3d 1179,1189 n.13 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Horstkoetter v. Dep't of
Pub. Safety. 159 F.3d 1265,1278 (10th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff must demonstrate through
binding precedent, or the weight of authority of other jurisdictions, that the right alleged
was clearly established); Foote v. Spiegel 118 F.3d 1416, 1424 (10th Cir. 1997) (contours
of alleged right, as established by controlling authority, must be "sufficiently clear that a
reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right");
D^Aguanno v. Gallagher. 50 F.3d 877, 881 n.6 (11th Cir. 1995) ("The remaining cases on
which plaintiffs rely do not come from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, or the Florida Supreme Court and, therefore, cannot show that
plaintiffs' right to due process was clearly established.").
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Plaintiff fails to identify even one prior court decision that would clearly establish
that a failure to adequately train and supervise inmates in a prison training program
constitutes either cruel and unusual punishment or unnecessarily rigorous treatment.
Instead, without any supporting authorities, he contends that Utah law establishes
standards for the operation of heavy equipment. Appellant's Brief at 26. Such an abstract
general proposition is inadequate to state a claim. What plaintiff must to show, by
binding legal authority, is that Utah's Constitutional prohibition against unnecessary rigor
has been found to be violated by a failure to adequately train and supervise inmates in a
workplace environment. This he has completely failed to do on appeal and in the trial
court.
We said in Lassiter that the most common error we encounter in qualified
immunity cases involves the point that "courts must not permit plaintiffs to
discharge their burden by referring to general rules and to the violation of
abstract 'rights.'" we emphasized that "[g]eneral propositions have little to
do with the concept of qualified immunity" and that the facts of a case
relied upon to clearly establish the law must "be materially similar,"
because "[p]ublic officials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in
drawing analogies from previously decided cases."
Hamilton v. Cannon. 80 F.3d 1525, 1531-32 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
The trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs third cause of action as far as it
sought to plead a state constitutional claim and that dismissal should be affirmed.
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B. No Facts Demonstrating Cruel and Unusual Punishment or Unnecessarily
Rigorous Treatment Were Alleged in the Complaint
Even if the plaintiff had met the flagrant violation test of Spademan, the trial court
was still correct to dismiss his state constitutional claim because the factual allegations of
the complaint did not state a claim that the plaintiff had been subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment or treated with unnecessary rigor. Utah's cruel and unusual
punishment, unnecessary rigor, clause was originally understood "to prohibit only certain
methods of punishment, including torture, that were deemed barbaric." State v. Gardner,
947 P.2d 630, 636 (Utah 1997). It has been extended to prohibit punishments that are
grossly disproportionate or that are excessive. Id at 638.
In the "conditions of confinement" area, cruel and unusual punishment must be
shown by evidence that the prison employee "acted with deliberate indifference or
inflicted unnecessary abuse" upon an inmate. Bott v. DeLand. 922 P.2d 732, 740 (Utah
1996). Plaintiff seeks to read too much into the words "deliberate indifference." This
standard was borrowed from the identical "cruel and unusual punishment" provision of
the federal constitution.
Precisely what constitutes deliberate indifference on the part of prison
officials has been the subject of some debate. It is at least clear that mere
negligence or inadvertence is insufficient to satisfy this standard. Indeed,
deliberate indifference requires the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain." In the work assignment context, prison officials are deliberately
indifferent when they '"knowingly... compel convicts to perform physical
labor ... which is beyond their strength, or which constitutes a danger to
their... health, or which is unduly painful.1" Thus, whatever its exact
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contours, deliberate indifference requires a highly culpable state of mind
approaching actual intent.
Choate v. Lockhart. 7 F.3d 1370, 1374 (8th Cir. 1993).
In Choate the court held that claims that a prison failed to take adequate safety
precautions on a worksite did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. IdL at 137576. To prove such a claim would require that there be evidence of knowledge of
"extreme dangers at the worksite" that were intentionally ignored. Id at 1375. The only
fact alleged by the plaintiff is that inadequate training and supervision led to a forklift
being mishandled and overturning on a prison worksite. The trial court correctly
dismissed this cause of action for failure to state a claim.
Nor did the plaintiff adequately allege facts that would show that he had been
treated with unnecessary rigor. This standard targets the infliction of unnecessary abuse.
Bott 922 P.2d at 740-41. "Under this standard, the main consideration is 'whether a
particular prison or police practice would be recognized as an abuse to the extent that it
cannot be justified by necessity.1 The definition of 'abuse' focuses on 'needlessly harsh,
degrading, or dehumanizing1 treatment of prisoners. Id at 740.
The plaintiffs factual allegations, that inmates in a prison training program were
inadequately trained and supervised, does not meet the definition of abuse under this
standard. No facts were alleged that would even begin to show that the plaintiffs
treatment was needlessly degrading or dehumanizing. Nor has he alleged facts that his
treatment was unconstitutionally harsh. The unnecessary rigor standard does not apply to
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these circumstances. It is not "a catch-all provision applicable to every adverse condition
accompanying confinement. Rather, it serves to prohibit extreme instances of
mistreatment and abuse.11 McQueen v. State. 711 N.E.2d 503, 505 (Ind. 1999). An
industrial accident allegedly caused by inadequate training and supervision does not come
within this definition of extreme mistreatment and abuse. The trial court correctly
dismissed the plaintiffs state constitutional claim and that decision should be affirmed on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, the trial court's decision, dismissing this action
with prejudice as to the State, should be affirmed.
DEFENDANT STATE OF UTAH DOES NOT DESIRE
ORAL ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION
Defendant-appellee State of Utah does not request oral argument and a published
opinion in this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already been decided
by the courts in published opinions, are not such that oral argument or a published
opinion are necessary, though the defendant desires to participate in oral argument if such
is held by the Court.
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RUSSON, Justice:
111 Paul Blackner ("Blackner") appeals from an order granting summary judgment to defendants the Town of
Alta, Utah ("Alta"), and the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
U2 On March 14,1998, an avalanche ("the first avalanche") thundered down on State Route 210, a two-lane
road, in the White Pine Chutes area of Little Cottonwood Canyon near Alta. It buried part of the road, blocking
the downhill lane of traffic. Soon thereafter, the avalanche was reported to Alta's Central Dispatch Office.
1J3 Kevin Payne ("Payne"), an Alta Deputy Marshal, was notified of the first avalanche and responded within
minutes. Upon arrival, Payne noticed that only one lane of traffic was open and became concerned that
vehicles traveling in opposite directions on State Route 210 would collide with one another in the avalanche
area. Therefore, he began to direct traffic. Several minutes after Payne arrived on the scene, Dave Medara
("Medara"), an avalanche forecaster with UDOT, who was also notified of the first avalanche, arrived on the
scene. After discussing the situation with Payne, Medara departed to assess other slide activity lower in the
canyon.

114 Several minutes later, a front-end loader was dispatched from the Snowbird Ski Area to remove the snow
from the road. While the loader was clearing the road, traffic on both sides of the first avalanche was stopped.
Payne instructed travelers in the canyon-including Blackner, who had been driving up Little Cottonwood
Canyon-to stop while the loader continued to work. As Blackner and others waited for the loader to finish
clearing the road, they exited their vehicles and stood on the roadside to watch the road-clearing activities.
1J5 After evaluating the slide activity lower in the canyon, Medara traveled up the canyon until he arrived at an
area just below the scene of the first avalanche. This was the same area where Blackner and the other
travelers had exited their vehicles. Medara became concerned when he noticed that the stopped vehicles,
including Blackner's vehicle, were located under a known avalanche slide area. Medara therefore informed
Payne by radio that he was concerned about the safety of his location and asked how long the loader would
continue working.
1J6 Seconds after Payne told Medara that the loader was taking its last scoop, a second avalanche occurred
("the second avalanche"). The second avalanche inundated the area where Medara and Blackner had stopped
their vehicles. Many people, including Medara and Blackner, were caught in and overwhelmed by the second
avalanche. Blackner was seriously injured. About thirty-four minutes passed between the first avalanche and
the second avalanche. Both of the avalanches originated on public land managed by the National Forest
Service as part of the Wasatch-Cache National Forest.
H7 Blackner brought suit against UDOT and Alta, alleging that their negligence in managing the first avalanche
resulted in his injuries. Both UDOT and Alta moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Governmental
Immunity Act (the "Act") barred Blackner's claims against them. Specifically, UDOT and Alta asserted that they
were immune from suit because subsections 63-30-10(11) and (13) of the Utah Code preclude suits against
governmental entities for injuries arising out of, in connection with, or resulting from (1) any natural condition
on publicly owned or controlled land and (2) the management of natural disasters. The trial court granted the
motions for summary judgment under both subsections of the Act. Blackner appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1J8 Summary judgment is proper only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, U 15,
P.3d
. When reviewing whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment, we accord the trial
court's legal conclusions no deference and review those conclusions for correctness. Ault 2002 UT 33 at U15.
Furthermore, a trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for correctness. State
ex rel. Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County. 2002 UT 8, H 8,
P.3d
; State v. Luskt
2001 UT102,U11,37P.3d1103.
ANALYSIS
1J9 The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting UDOT and Alta summary
judgment under subsections 63-30-10(11) and (13) of the Act. Specifically, the issue is whether the trial court
correctly interpreted the exceptions set forth in those subsections in holding that UDOT and Alta are immune
from suit on Blackner's negligence claim because Blackner's injuries arose out of, were in connection with, or
resulted from a natural condition on public lands or the management of a natural disaster. Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-10(11), (13) (1997).
1J10 Generally, to determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under the Act, we apply a
three-part test, which assesses (1) whether the activity undertaken is a governmental function; (2) whether
governmental immunity was waived for the particular activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to that
waiver. See Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159,162 (Utah 1996); Keeaan v. State, 896 P.2d 618,
619-20 (Utah 1995). However, in this case, the parties do not dispute whether immunity has been waived, but
rather dispute only whether an exception to that waiver applies pursuant to the third part of the test. Thus, we
address only the issue of whether a specific exception applies to the waiver of immunity.
1J11 The relevant portion of the Act provides:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or
omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:

(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, [or]

(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters
Id. (emphasis added). We first resolve whether UDOT and Alta are immune from Blackner's suit under
subsection (11), and if they are immune, we need not address whether they are immune under subsection
(13).
1J12 To resolve whether the trial court erred in concluding that UDOT and Alta were immune from Blackner's
suit under subsection (11) because his injuries arose out of, were connected with, or resulted from a natural
condition on publicly owned or controlled land, we must determine whether the trial court correctly interpreted
section 63-30-10(11) of the Utah Code. When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first
looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.
State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, H 19, 37 P.3d 1103; City of Hildale v. Cooke. 2001 UT 56, U 36, 28 P.3d 697. The
statute's language plainly states that all governmental entities are immune from suit for a government
employee's negligence when the plaintiffs injury arose from, was connected with, or resulted from a "natural
condition on publicly owned or controlled lands." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(11) (1997).
1J13 Blackner does not argue that the first avalanche was not a natural condition. Rather, he contends that the
negligence of UDOT and Alta was the proximate cause of his injuries instead of that avalanche. However,
Blackner's argument either miscomprehends or misapplies the plain language of the Act. The Act
unequivocally provides that when a plaintiffs injury either "arises out of[] [or] in connection with, or results
from" a "natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands," governmental immunity is retained with
respect to any action to recover for injuries proximately caused by a government employee's negligence. The
application of the "natural condition" exception to the waiver of governmental immunity does not hinge on
whether the "natural condition" in any way "proximately caused" the plaintiffs injuries. See id.
1J14 In the instant case, even assuming that the actions of Payne and Medara were negligent and proximately
caused Blackner's injuries, UDOT and Alta are immune from suit to recover for those injuries because
Blackner's injuries arose out of a natural condition on publicly owned or controlled land. The first avalanche
and the snow pack from which both avalanches originated were natural conditions. The snow pack was
situated on Forest Service land, and the first avalanche partially covered and blocked Route 210, a stateowned-and-controlled road.
1J15 Further, Blackner's injuries arose out of the snow pack and the first avalanche. Under the statute, the
"arise out of language requires only that there be some causal nexus between the risk and the resulting injury.
Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist. 927 P.2d 159,163 (Utah 1996). In other words, but for the snow pack and the
first avalanche, Blackner would not have suffered injury. See id. Here, were it not for the first avalanche, Payne
would not have stopped Blackner and others from proceeding up the canyon. In addition, if the snow pack had
not been situated on public land above Route 210, it would not have resulted in either avalanche, which
caused Payne to stop traffic from moving up the canyon and directly occasioned Blackner's injuries.
1116 Therefore, Blackner's injuries arose out of a natural condition existing on publicly owned or controlled land.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that UDOT and Alta are immune from Blackner's suit because
the "natural condition" exception to the waiver of governmental
immunity applies to Blackner's injuries
regardless of whether Payne and Medara were negligent.111
CONCLUSION
1J17 The trial court correctly granted UDOT and Alta summary judgment under the Governmental Immunity Act
because Blackner's injuries arose out of, were in connection with, or resulted from a natural condition on
publicly owned or controlled land. We therefore affirm.

1J18 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Howe, and Justice Wilkins concur in

Justice Russon's opinion.
1. Blackner also contends on appeal that if we were to affirm the trial court's summary judgment order in this
case, our affirmance would be contrary to public policy. However, Blackner never raised this argument before
the trial court and has thus waived the argument on appeal. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas &
Mining, 2001 UT 112, n.5, 38 P.3d 291; Treff v. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, fl 15, 26 P.3d 212.

